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ABSTRACT
This paper uses two Asian case studies to illustrate the issues that developers of virtual worlds 
should address as they mature. The Korean case emphasizes the phenomenon of item trading. 
This  involves  emergent  markets  linking  real  world  currency  to  items  existing  on  company 
servers. The practice has resulted in controversial and unresolved legal issues. Companies such 
as ItemBay have grown to take advantage of these opportunities. The Chinese case emphasizes 
the  transformation  of  business  models  over  time  as  well  as  community  control.  The  paper 
discusses feedback effects between broadband adoption and online games as well as issues such 
as Waigua, private servers, virtual property trade, and developer control. The experience of these 
countries shows that initial technical challenges for business models were overcome but new 
ones are beginning to emerge as the industry evolves. The new environment requires a change in 
the assumptions under which the game industry has operated.
Keywords
virtual worlds, online game industry, business models, item trade
This paper uses a business model framework to help identify the issues that developers of virtual 
worlds (VWs) have to address as their enterprises mature. While most virtual worlds have adopt­
ed subscription models there is an increasing trend toward digital item sale. This arises from the 
emergent markets linking real world currency to items existing on company servers. This prac­
tice has resulted in controversial and unresolved legal issues. This paper identifies the challenges 
that developers of VWs will face in their efforts to find viable business models and address is­
sues of control. Two Asian case studies, from Korea and China, illustrate these ideas. The Kore­
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an case focuses on the phenomenon of item trading while the Chinese case emphasizes business 
models.
While VWs have existed for less than a decade, they are growing rapidly and have become a 
mainstream form of entertainment in some areas of the world. Game environments are becoming 
more immersive and compelling and if  this  rate  of  improvement  continues,  such as through 
growing  broadband  penetration,  they  are  likely  to  become  as  common  as  other  forms  of 
entertainment.
VIRTUAL WORLDS IN KOREA
Korea is one of the leading countries in terms of broadband access in the world. Statistics from 
the National Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA) [1] indicate that 68.8% of all Kore­
an households have Internet access at home. Primary reasons for accessing the Internet are to 
search for data and information (72.8%), to play games (52.5%) and to use e-mail (51.3%).
One  of  the  first  item auction  agencies,  ItemBay,  was  set  up  in  Korea  in  2001  to  facilitate 
transactions of digital items used in virtual worlds. The early success of this trading business, 
with over $200 million in transactions in 2004, has prompted further entry and the number of 
item trade companies is known to exceed 300 in Korea alone.
Even in Korea, which is facing governance issues regarding digital property before any other 
country, the issue is not yet settled. According to Hye-Jin Han of ItemBay, game developers 
have differing positions on this issue. Large game developers such as NCSoft strongly object to 
item transactions. Small game developers, on the other hand, believe that the existence of third-
party item trade agencies such as ItemBay attract more players to their games. This results in 
greater flexibility as people are able to trade items of one game for items from another game, 
thus facilitating entry into smaller virtual worlds. The company ItemBay has pursued strategic 
relationships with small game developers.
In a 2003 survey by the Korea Game Development & Promotion Institute (KGDI) [2], 18.7% of 
companies stated that item transactions should be banned and regulated as illegal activity; 29.7% 
believed  that  item  transaction  should  be  accepted  but  regulation  of  transactions  should  be 
reinforced; 19.8% said that item transaction is desirable and should be encouraged but should 
have a transaction limit; 27.5% said that transaction of items is a transaction between individuals 
based on their free will and it should not be regulated; 2.2% said that item transaction should be 
legally accepted and encouraged. 
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Most of the disputes related to transactions of digital items are caused by fraud. Fraud takes 
place under the following circumstances. An agreement is made between those who want to sell 
items or virtual money (A) and buying players who want to attain higher levels inside the virtual 
community (B). B pays real currency for items or virtual currency to A. A might take money or 
real currency from B but does not provide the item or A might transfer different items to B. 
Hacking can also occur to obtain other players’ items or virtual money. Hackers may try to gain 
access to the game’s servers with other players’ ID and password and take their items and virtual 
currency. Hackers also try to gain access to servers of game developers and copy virtual money 
or  high-priced  items.  They  could  also  develop  programs  to  create  virtual  money  through 
exploiting a bug.
It is difficult to determine how many item transactions are conducted in a black market without 
established intermediaries. As of 2003, it was estimated that around 43% of item transactions 
were direct. According to ItemBay, the black market mechanism leads to cyber crime. If direct 
transactions can be diverted to a third party business like ItemBay, this could reduce cyber crime. 
ItemBay also emphasizes that its cyber crime rate is only 0.01% of its transactions.
Munwha Ilbo, a major news agency in Korea, published statistics from the cyber terror response 
center (CTRC) in April 2004. According to the CTRC [7], 70% of crimes committed by teens are 
related to item trade fraud, which has increased significantly in the last few years. In 2000 there 
were only 675 cases; in 2001 there were 2,193; in 2002 the number increased to 8,250 and in 
2003 the  total  number  of  cyber  crimes  was  10,187.  This  rapid increase  in  cyber  crime has 
generated public debate about who should be responsible for this situation. It has forced parents, 
academics,  government  officials,  game developers,  and  game item transaction  companies  to 
determine the type of actions that should be taken to correct this situation. 
ItemBay exercises the following practices to secure a safe item transaction environment and to 
avoid item trade fraud. It has set up a member monitoring system. This system allows ItemBay 
members to regulate those who attempt fraud while conducting an item trade through developing 
a blacklist  that then is used to filter  members. It  has a system to verify its members’ credit 
records and it has established a fraud compensation system to encourage transactions. If a fraud 
case  emerges  and  the  member  is  able  to  prove  that  he  followed  the  rules  then  ItemBay 
compensates the member for any fraud damage according to pre-established criteria.
The Korean government has not yet found an appropriate solution to the problem of item trade 
fraud.  Due  to  the  lack  of  flexibility  of  existing  laws  to  accommodate  the  emerging  cyber 
economy in online game communities, many youths are charged as criminals.
According to Joo-Young Kim of NCSoft, in March 2004 the company asked the Ministry of 
Culture & Tourism (MCT) legislate item transactions in real currency. It requested that MCT 
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modify current laws governing music, video, games, and item leases. NCSoft also asked the 
Information Communication Ethics Committee to prepare a draft regulatory scheme to limit item 
transactions in real currency. NCSoft explained that these efforts are necessary to ward off cyber 
crimes and to protect the copyrights of game developers and other legitimate copyrighters.
Kim explained  why  NCSoft  decided  to  take  this  action.  Online  game  communities  can  be 
negatively  affected  by  fraudulent  item  transactions.  This  in  turn  will  lead  the  politics  and 
economics of these communities to develop differently from the game developer’s intentions. 
For example, Lineage is designed to be updated every six months but such a plan cannot be 
applied due to unexpected item transaction activities. 
The crime rate in virtual communities is increasing, which in turn affects social stability in the 
real world. Jeong-Woong Park, a game user, stated that online game developers already have 
strong influence upon society and they also have to be responsible for it. As Park highlighted, 
game developers are expected to consider the public interest as well as their profits both in the 
virtual and real world.
Because of the increasing problem of cyber crime, the private sector is also taking precautions of 
their own to limit the number of disputes or fraud that happen in the exchange of digital property. 
ItemBay has strong security measures. To conduct an item auction, registration is mandatory and 
it requires authentication of its members’ identity. The company requests the real name, cell 
phone number, address, and other contact information such as company or school as well as the 
residential  registration  number  (RRN).  The  RRN in  Korea  is  similar  to  the  social  security 
number in the United States. It is illegal to misuse an RRN. If an ItemBay member provides 
inaccurate  contact  details  it  can  lead  to  an  item  trade  failure  and  membership  suspension. 
ItemBay has obtained the cooperation of the Korea Information Service in order to confirm 
registration information. They expect that this measure will reduce the number of disputes and 
fraud that occur in these settings. More detail about the Korean case is available in [13].
VIRTUAL WORLDS IN CHINA
In spite of the profitability of major Chinese VW operators, close observation of the Chinese 
case suggests that even the most successful VW operators are still in the early stages of the de­
velopment of business models that influence business evolution [11].
China’s VW industry has so far initiated little innovation in terms of business models or online 
game technologies except  in developing some online real-time payment  systems to facilitate 
game distribution through various outlets and users’ purchase of online game point cards and 
monthly  cards.  In  the  past,  the  focus  of  competition  in  the  Chinese  VW  industry  was  on 
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improving distribution channels and operating efficiency. Though the technology and industry 
have evolved over the past few years, companies still remain in the process of overcoming some 
of the early stage obstacles that they have failed to effectively deal with so far. The industry is 
currently moving through the second iteration of the business model stages, having to adjust to 
new technical and environmental issues that were not anticipated in the first years.
Waigua is a type of software designed to automatically conduct activities for players within the 
gaming environment in order to quickly increase their level even when they are not actually at 
their computer. Waigua is thus similar to the concept of “gold farming” discussed in the online 
game  literature,  where  users  develop  macros  that  enable  them  to  accumulate  digital  assets 
without having to engage in the effort typically required to achieve this. To combat this problem, 
online  game  operators  and  developers  have  to  overcome  both  technical  and  environmental 
challenges. Some operators have suspended or canceled accounts. A purely technical solution is 
unlikely to entirely solve the Waigua problem, however, because financial incentives, technical 
challenge, and the satisfaction of developing Waigua to defeat counter-Waigua technologies will 
always inspire some to do this.
Private servers are an even bigger potential problem for game providers than Waigua. “Private 
server” refers to the situation where the server source code is stolen, hacked, or otherwise leaked. 
As a result, some people set up their own game servers using the leaked source code and charge 
users for playing on their own servers. In many cases, these people do not even utilize dedicated 
game servers but common Internet servers in order to cut costs. Not only do those people who 
run such illegal private servers not pay any licensing fee to the game developer, they typically 
charge players lower fees, which results in substantially lower revenue for the game operator. 
The Chinese VW industry has been working closely with the government and law enforcement 
authorities to crack down upon the usage and spread of private servers in China.
Another important issue in managing virtual worlds is the trade in digital items. When users 
associate VW items with value demonstrated in real world markets, the developer might become 
liable  for  loss  due  to  circumstances  within  its  control.  Systems  therefore  must  be  protected 
against  hacking,  cheating,  and  scamming.  The  company  Arctic  Ice,  for  example,  did  not 
sufficiently secure its systems from hacking and in 2003 was found liable by Beijing’s Chaoyang 
District People’s Court for a player’s lost virtual property [5]. This may be the first case of its 
type  in  the  world  but  others  are  certain  to  follow.  VW  developers  have  hoped  to  protect 
themselves against litigation by explicitly claiming in end user license agreements (EULAs) that 
virtual property has no real world value. If courts find, however, that users have a reasonable 
expectation that these items hold value, the claim made in the EULA may not be sufficient to 
protect  the  developer.  These  property  right  claims  will  need  to  be  resolved  before  more 
sophisticated transactions such as bartering with physical goods and seamless exchange between 
virtual and real currency can be executed.
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One of  the  most  important  considerations  for  game developers  and  operators  is  to  create  a 
positive environment using technical, non-technical, direct and indirect methods so that players’ 
virtual  property  and  other  items  within  the  VW that  hold  value  within  the  community  are 
protected [11]. Recent measures taken by Chinese game concerns to achieve this end include the 
establishment  of  a  group  of  independent  game  players  with  the  mission  of  monitoring  and 
investigating every aspect of the service provided by operators that is relevant for players such as 
customer  service,  performance  of  game  masters,  technical  support,  game-related  dispute 
settlement, and planning for new games. Such independent players monitor the above operational 
aspects of game operators to ensure that it behaves in a fair and transparent fashion.
The above measures reflect controls by both operators and game players themselves. MacInnes 
[11] developed a diagram, represented in Figure 1, to show the different levels of control that can 
be undertaken in VWs. Hobbesian communities emerge when the developer  does  not  set  or 
enforce rules and does not provide the tools to foster governance by the players. Panopticon 
communities, in contrast, are under the absolute control of the developer, who sets and strictly 
enforces rules without input from the players. Open communities are entirely under the control 
of the users. Developers of such a community cede ownership of it to the players and maintain a 
minimal role if any in its maintenance. Shared governance communities are likely to grow as 
developers gain experience in managing social dynamics and begin to understand the incentives 
and rules necessary to enable joint governance of their creations.
Open
communities
Hobbesian
communities
Shared governance
communities
User control
Developer control
Panopticon
communities
Figure 1: Control in Virtual World Communities
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Chinese game operators are moving toward the shared governance scenario, as can be seen by 
their attempts to give players a role in developing a positive community atmosphere. Panopticon 
communities have not been common in China’s VW industry, which may be related to one of the 
national culture characteristics of China discussed at the beginning of this paper: low degree of 
uncertainty avoidance. Chinese culture tends to tolerate, and in some sense even celebrate, uncer­
tain situations where rules or goals are not clearly defined or multiple factors come into play si­
multaneously. As a result, a Panopticon virtual community may not appeal to most Chinese on­
line game users because its rules are meticulously stipulated and enforced by game developers 
and therefore allow almost no uncertainty within the VW.
While the industry’s current focus on environmental factors will continue, it will gradually shift 
toward factors related to revenue models. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Based on the framework 
in MacInnes [11] it  represents the business model as a dynamic process that encompasses a 
company’s activities that would allow it to capitalize from the value it provides to customers, 
which  include  technical  efficiencies,  environmental  considerations,  revenue  streams,  and 
innovation over time. The factors that affect the success of a company’s business model at its 
early stages are different from those affecting the business at a more mature stage. In the first 
stage  technical  issues  are  of  greatest  importance.  The  second  stage  involves  environmental 
factors  such  as  laws;  regulations  regarding  aspects  such  as  copyrights,  privacy,  freedom of 
expression; and their affect on adoption. In the third stage, developers can begin to incorporate 
traditional business model factors such as revenue streams, marketing, and customer support. 
The fourth stage focuses on factors that will sustain the business. While still in early iterations, 
the Chinese industry has matured somewhat, as can be seen by the movement toward listings in 
overseas financial markets by companies such as Shanda.
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Figure 1: Trends in the Chinese VW Industry
The Chinese VW industry has relied on import licenses and needs to move toward a new model. 
Barriers to entry under the existing model are low and it is increasingly difficult for companies to 
differentiate  themselves  in  a  crowded  market.  Bargaining  power  is  concentrated  with  the 
upstream companies, usually overseas developers, and risk is born largely by local operators. 
The online game industry has not yet been accepted as a mainstream format for entertainment 
within  the  Chinese  society  and  thus  the  government  is  likely  to  impose  greater  regulatory 
restrictions  to  minimize  their  negative  societal  impact.  Game  users  will  also  become more 
sophisticated and selective as the industry continues to grow and evolve. All of these factors are 
harbingers of greater competition. Some Chinese game companies are no longer operating the 
products they imported from Korea. This may be an early sign of a shift toward a new approach. 
More detail on the Chinese case is available in [12]. 
CONCLUSION
This paper shows that the initial technical challenges for business models have been overcome 
but new ones are beginning to emerge as the industry evolves. The technical challenges are no 
longer related to basic functions but to the environmental factors related to the running of a busi­
ness of this sort. Companies need to be more concerned about security issues in order to prevent 
losses of digital items that players see as valuable and worthy of trade. There are also many envi­
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ronmental factors that these companies need to address. At this point issues such as freedom of 
expression, control over user behavior, and jurisdictional disparities have not yet received the at­
tention of policymakers because economic activities in these forums are an emerging trend. The 
phenomenon of online games and virtual worlds remains new and will be subject to debate for 
many years to come. It requires a major change in the assumptions under which the game indus­
try has operated. Korea and China have been leaders in the phenomenon of virtual worlds and 
they merit further study as their markets mature.
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